Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (平装) 0415283566

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This comprehensive and leading textbook has been revised and reworked building on the themes of the first edition. As before it covers all aspects of the nature of mind, and is ideal for anyone coming to philosophy of mind for the first time.
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'I enjoyed reading this book immensely and think very hightly indeed of it both as a student text and as a serious work of philosophy. It is well-organized, well-informed, up-to-date, comprehensive in scope, and written in an extremely clear and accessible style.' - E. J. Lowe, Durham University, on the 1st edition 'It is pitched at the right level for undergraduates... The book reads as the work of a very good philosopher who wants to introduce students to the topic.' - Times Higher Education Supplement, on the 1st edition 'Contains some of the clearest and most penetrating discussions I have ever read of functionalism and of the interpretative accounts of Davidson and Dennett. This fact alone makes the book an appealing candidate for upper-level undergraduate courses.' - Philosophical Quarterley, on the 1st edition
作者简介
John Heil is Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College.
目录
Preface to the second edition Preface to the first edition 1. Introduction 1.1 Experience and reality 1.2 The unavoidability of the philosophy of mind 1.3 Science and metaphysics 1.4 Metaphysics and cognitive science 1.5 A look ahead Suggested reading 2. Cartesian Dualism 2.1 Science and philosophy2.2 Descartes's Dualism 2.3 Substances, attributes, and modes 2.4 The metaphysics of Cartesian Dualism 2.5 Mind-body interaction Suggested reading 3. Decartes's legacy 3.1 Dualismwithout interaction 3.2 Parallelism 3.3 Occasionalism 3.4 Causation and occasionalism 3.5 Idealism 3.6 Mind and meaning3.7 Epiphenomealism Suggested reading 4. Non-Cartesian Dualism 4.1 Three facets of Cartesian Dualism 4.2 Individuating substances 4.3 Metaphysical interlude 4.4 Substance dualism 4.5 Self-body interaction 4.6 Taking stock Suggested reading5. Behaviourism 5.1 Moving away from Dualism 5.2 Historicaland philosophical background 5.3 Privacy and its consequences 5.4 The beetle in the box 5.5 Philosophical behaviourism 5.6 Dispositions 5.7 Behavioural analysis 5.8 Sensation 5.9 The legacy of philosophical behaviourism 5.10 Intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics 5.11 Psychological behaviourism 5.12 The demise of behaviourism Suggested reading 6. The identity theory 6.1 Correlation to identification 6.2 Parsimony 6.3 Self-conscious thought 6.4 Locating mental qualities 6.5 Substance, properties, states, and events 6.6 Predicates andproperties 6.7 Strict identity 6.8 Leibniz's law 6.9 The 64 dollar question 6.10 Qualities of experiences and qualities experienced 6.11 Epistemological loose ends 6.12 Taking stock Suggested reading 7. Functionalism 7.1 The emergence of functionalism 7.2 The functionalist picture 7.3 Abstraction as partial consideration 7.4 Minds as computing machines 7.5 Functional explanation 7.6 Functionalist ontology 7.7 Functionalism and materialism 7.8 Functional properties 7.9 Mental properties as functional properties 7.10 Functionalism and behaviourism 7.11 Characterizing functional states 7.12 Total functional systems Suggested reading 8. The representational theory of mind 8.1 Mental representation 8.2 Semantic engines 8.3 The mind as a semantic engine 8.4 The Chinese room 8.5 From syntax to semantics 8.6 Levels of description 8.7 Levels of description and the special sciences 8.8 From taxonomy toontology 8.9 Layers of reality Suggested reading 9. Qualia 9.1 Qualities of conscious experience 9.2 Zombies 9.3Biting the bullet 9.4 Living without Qualia 9.5 The mystery of consciousness Suggested reading 10. Radical interpretation 10.1 Minds as constructs 10.2 Davidson and the propositional attitudes 10.3 Semantic opacity 10.4 Radical interpretation: Background issues 10.5 T-theories 10.6 From T-theories to I-theories 10. 7 Decision theory 10.8 Charity 10.9 Indeterminacy 10.10 The omniscient interpreter 10.11 Inte
出版社Routledge
作者John Heil